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Abstract
Contrary to general belief, ethical progress as a means to attain the divine and thereby 
achieve salvation occupies a central place in the Nag Hammadi writings. Plato’s con-
ception of the homoiosis theo or “likeness to god” fĳits very well this dynamic view of 
man, since it optimistically claims the possibility of human development and progress. 
Plato’s dialogues are far from offfering a univocal exposition of how this progress was 
fulfĳilled, but later Platonists show a rather systematizing tendency. The present paper 
provides an overview of the homoiosis theo in the Platonic dialogues and evaluates its 
appropriation by both Middle Platonism and the world of Gnosis. It also offfers an expo-
sition and analysis of those Nag Hammadi writings that may allow a proper under-
standing of the meaning and goal of the homoiosis theo in this collection of texts.
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Readers acquainted with the so-called Gnostic worldview through the 
testimony of anti-heretical writers or through manuals of a more or less 
general character will probably be astonished to fĳind in the following 
pages an assessment of the homoiosis theo or “likeness to god” as a central 
motif in the Nag Hammadi texts. On the one hand, the likeness to god 
might be described as an optimistic conception that claims the possibil-
ity of human development and progress; on the other, the traditional 72  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
view of Gnosticism presents it as an eminently pessimistic worldview1 
that stubbornly refused to interact with reality and claimed the need to 
depart from this world as soon as possible.2 The latter view, however, 
mainly proceeds from the biased report of the anti-heretical writers, 
who transmitted a rather distorted interpretation of Gnostic anthro-
pology, according to which the three predetermined human classes of 
pneumatikoi, psychikoi, and hylikoi3 ruled out the possibility of change 
either for the better or the worse.4 This apparently static character is 
frequently reinforced by handbooks on Gnosticism, which tend to pro-
vide a rather intellectualistic approach to the Gnostic telos or “supreme 
fulfĳillment” of life, considered as the acquaintance with the divine.5 
Indeed, these overviews tend to focus on the epistemological goal of the 
knowledge of god and the methods of attaining it, obviating in this way 
the preceding laborious process that makes such knowledge possible, 
and thus providing a rather static view of Gnostic  anthropology.
The discovery of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts has, however, dra-
matically changed our conception of the Gnostic worldview. We now 
know, for example, that determinism, in spite of the heresiologists,6 did 
1) This pessimism transpires, for example, in Jonas’s description (1970:42–47) of the 
main tenets of Gnosticism.
2) This view is based to some extent on the so-called strong dualism that, according to 
the traditional and biased interpretation of Gnosticism, characterized Gnostic thought. 
See Jonas 1970: passim; Chadwick 1967:35–38; Pearson 1990:148–164.
3) On the Gnostic tripartite division of humanity according to the heresiologists, see 
Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.7.5; Clemens of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto 54.1; Ter-
tullian, Against Valentinians 29; Hippolytus, Ref. 6.31.9; Epiphanius, Panarion 31.23.1–4; 
cf. Corpus Hermeticum 1.19.
4) Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.6.2–3, provides the classical example of this view: “Ani-
mal men, again, are instructed in animal things; such men, namely, as are established 
by their works, and by a mere faith, while they have not perfect knowledge. We of the 
Church, they say, are these persons. Wherefore also they maintain that good works 
are necessary to us, for that otherwise it is impossible we should be saved. But as to 
themselves, they hold that they shall be entirely and undoubtedly saved, not by means 
of conduct, but because they are spiritual by nature.” On Irenaeus and his treatment of 
his opponents, see King 2003a:21–52.
5) Thus, for example, Turner 2001:485–495.
6) In point of fact, Löhr 1992:381–390 at 385, has already pointed out that Plotinus, in 
his criticism of Gnosticism, did not mention determinism as an important feature of 
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not characterize Gnostic anthropology. Rather than being pre-estab-
lished and static, the Gnostic view of man appears very dynamic, as 
ethical progress was essential in order to follow the laborious path at 
the end of which the Gnostic individual could attain the desired fusion 
with the divinity and, thereby, salvation.7 Admittedly, the results of the 
important investigations that changed our understanding of Gnostic 
anthropology have only recently begun to replace older views and to 
permeate those of a wider public. In general, the biased and prejudiced 
expositions of the heresiologists obstinately persist beyond the confĳined 
world of specialists. The homoiosis theo or likeness to god, provides us 
with an excellent occasion to restate some of these new insights. The 
analysis of its paramount position among Nag Hammadi texts will show 
both that this corpus provides a parallel to Middle Platonic views on the 
issue and that accusations of determinism and a lack of ethical concern 
were simple slanders coming from the Church fathers.
This contribution is organized into three sections. The fĳirst generally 
approaches the homoiosis theo in the Platonic dialogues and evaluates 
its appropriation by both Middle Platonism and the world of Gnosis. 
The second section offfers an exposition of those Nag Hammadi writ-
ings that may allow a proper understanding of the meaning and goal of 
the homoiosis theo in the context of this corpus. The third section offfers 
some closing remarks.
Plato’s Conception of the homoiosis theo in Middle Platonism 
and Gnosis
“Becoming god,” “becoming like god,” or “assimilating to god” are the 
standard translations of Plato’s ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ. In spite of some opinions to 
the contrary, this idea, of Pre-Socratic provenance,8 plays a central place 
in Plato’s works. According to the Pythagorean view of life reflected in 
a famous passage of the Theaetetus, “a man should make all haste to 
7) The revision of this approach began with Schottrofff 1969:65–97, but was further 
developed by many other studies: Pagels 1974:35–53; Desjardins 1990; Löhr 1992; Wil-
liams 1996:189–212; King 2003a:201–208; Luttikhuizen 2003:203–217 at 203–207; Lut-
tikhuizen 2006:83–86.
8) On the Pre-Socratics, see most recently, Miller 2011:12–42, for the notion in Heracli-
tus, and 43–77, for Parmenides and Pythagoras.74  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
escape from earth to heaven; and to escape is to become like god, so far 
as this is possible.”9 This straightforward and concise defĳinition of the 
goal of human life relies on a number of assumptions, the most obvi-
ous of which is the Pythagorean soul-body dualism and its implicit hier-
archy: while the former is the true, divine self, the latter is an odious 
accretion that hinders the fulfĳillment of the real “I.” The soul is of divine 
origin and shares with the gods its nature and character, namely immor-
tality and rationality. However, due to it being forced to cope with the 
body — another assumption of Pythagorean origin — with its material 
urges and dependence on the external world due to being spellbound 
by sensory perception, the soul’s pristine divine nature appears to be 
degraded in the world of change. Human beings should live in accor-
dance with the dictates of man’s highest and only divine element, but 
due to this unnatural mix and forced communion with the body, which 
is described in very dark hues as its prison or tomb, the soul is wholly 
oblivious of its own true origin and lives a life of servitude to it.
This is the reason why, when dealing with the process by means of 
which man becomes god or like god, the texts speak of a “transforma-
tion” of the soul. Of course, the soul is originally divine and strictly 
speaking nothing can alter its nature, but confĳined to the body it is 
denaturalized and needs to regain its pristine condition. Plato’s famous 
motto, the ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the “likeness (or assimilation)
to god as far as this is possible,” therefore presents this process as a sort 
of metamorphosis, as a change from the worst to the better that, how-
ever, requires man’s fĳirm determination to purify his immortal nature 
from all the pollution proceeding from the mortal side of his being. How 
is this achieved? The answer depends on which dialogue we look at, 
since Plato seems to present a far from unifĳied and defĳinitive view of 
this process of liberation. In any case, however, the exercise of rational-
ity and the avoidance of everything related to the physical realm seems 
to be a precondition, since, as the Phaedo puts it,10 “no one may join 
the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not 
completely pure when he departs from life.” In this sense, philosophy 
   9) Plato, Theaetetus 176A –B.
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appears as the means to purify one’s soul from its impurity in order to 
present it without stain before the gods.
Indeed, as is also the case with numerous essential aspects of his 
philosophy — I am thinking, for example, of his psychology or con-
cept of the soul11 — Plato is far from offfering a monolithic exposition 
of the homoiosis theo.12 In spite of the central place it already occupies 
in his earlier dialogues, the likeness to god is dealt with diffferently in 
various works.13 Alcinous, before proceeding to offfer an overview of the 
diffferent Platonic places dealing with the issue in his Handbook of Pla-
tonism, already states that Plato presented the idea in “various forms” 
(ποικίλως).14 This variety of approaches in Plato’s dialogues may be the 
reason why later Platonists, in an attempt to systematize this variety 
of views, even claimed that Plato, following the division of philosophy 
into physics, ethics, and logic, approached the likeness to god physically 
in the Timaeus, ethically in the Republic and (epistemo)logically in the 
Theaetetus.15 However, Plato also dealt with the issue in several other 
dialogues, such as the Symposium, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, and in 
the Laws.16 This is hardly the place to provide a thorough analysis of 
11) For a synthesizing overview, see Roig Lanzillotta 2013. For a more extensive treat-
ment, see Robinson 1995, 2002:37–55.
12) In spite of the repeated complaints by scholars regarding the absence of interest in 
and of studies on the “likeness to God” in Plato, there are, as a matter of fact, several 
interesting publications on the theme: Merki 1952; Müller 1965:180–193; Rolofff 1970; 
Schefffel 1976:133–139; Sedley 1997:327–339; Annas 1999:52–71; Comoth 1999:69–75; Cooke 
1999:37–44; Sedley 1999:309–328; Erler 2002:159–181; Russell 2004:241–260; Armstrong 
2004:171–183; Baltzly 2004:297–321; Lavecchia 2006; see, most recently, Miller 2011.
13) Annas 1999:61.
14) Alcinous, Didaskalikos 181.20–21, on which see Dillon 1993:171–176.
15) Thus Stobaeus 2.49.18–22, who, according to some scholars seems to rely on the 
testimony of Eudorus. Dörrie and Baltes 1996:226–227, Baustein 101.3, have pointed out 
that this division is clearly artifĳicial and has as its only basis the general view that the 
Theaetetus was a “logical” dialogue, while Timaeus and the Republic were physical and 
ethical. See on the issue, Dillon 1996:114–137; Sedley 1997:337; Erler 2002:159. That the 
view might originate in Eudorus, however, has been denied by Moraux 1973:266–271 
and by Lévy 1990:50–65. 
16) Plato’s homoiosis theo is dealt with in the following dialogues: Symposium 
207E–209E; Theaetetus 176B–C; Republic 500B8–D1, 611D–E, 613A7–613B1; Laws 716C1–
E2;  Phaedo 64A–67E, 81A–84B; Phaedrus  245C–249A;  Philebus  28C–30E;  Timaeus 
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the diffferent characters and nuances of the Platonic passages. A short 
overview will sufffĳice to understand the hermeneutical difffĳiculties faced 
by later interpreters when approaching Plato’s motif.
To begin with, I will refer to Diotima’s speech in the Symposium,17 
since this passage was a fundamental one both for Middle Platonism 
and Gnosticism.18 In it the priestess states that every mortal creature 
aspires to immortality “as far as this is possible” and that procreation is 
the means to achieve this. Humans, however, have two modes at their 
disposal: procreation by means of the body and procreation by means of 
the soul. Even if the former may provide some kind of immortality — in 
fact the only one attainable in the realm of mortal corporeality — it is 
only through higher forms that humans really achieve their goal: the 
human quest for fame, virtue, and justice and especially the desire to 
engender moral goodness in others are attempts to reach immortality 
through man’s most divine part, to wit, the soul. It is in this way that 
humans come as close as possible to god.19
In contrast, the Republic and the Laws present a more moral approach 
to the homoiosis.20 Rather than being a means to achieve immortality, 
the likeness to god means maintaining a life of virtue that follows the 
pattern of god’s virtue.21 It might be that the diffference in focus, when 
compared with the Symposium, is due to the fact that Plato at that stage 
of his career did not yet consider immortality as an intrinsic character-
istic of the soul.22 The situation is diffferent in the Republic and the Laws. 
Given that immortality is now inherent to the soul, man’s goal is to 
become like god as far as this is possible in this life. God is the measure 
of everything, and by following the divinity, namely by being pure and 
just, we maintain a life that is benefĳicial both for ourselves and for the 
community. In both works, humans liken themselves to god by being 
virtuous,23 that is, by acting in and facing the world as they fĳind it.
17)   See Sedley 1999:310–311.
18)   On the influence of this section of Plato’s Symposium on the Nag Hammadi writing 
called The Expository Treatise on the Soul, see Roig Lanzillotta 2010:401–420.
19)   Plato, Symposium 207E–209E.
20) Plato, Republic 500B8–D1, 611D–E, 613A7–613B1; Laws 716C1–E2.
21)   In general, see Russell 2004:243–244.
22) See Sedley 1999:310–311.
23) Plato, Republic 613A 8–B 1. On Plato’s homoiosis theo in the Republic see Cooke 
1999:37–44.  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102  77
The Theaetetus and the Phaedo go a step further insofar as they com-
bine the view that humans become assimilated to the divinity by means 
of virtue, with a rather negative conception of man’s life in the world 
of movement.24 Virtue is not recommended for the communal good in 
this world, but rather as an escape from it. According to the Theaetetus, 
only virtue is exclusively good and does not share the mixture of good 
and bad that characterizes human life. Since god is virtue par excellence, 
human beings attain the likeness to god by following a virtuous life and 
by attempting thereby to leave this life as soon as possible.25 In the 
Phaedo, Socrates defĳines the true virtue of the philosopher, who “prac-
tices death” insofar as his dealings with the afffairs of the soul and his 
neglect of those of the body — such as desire and sensory perception — 
allow him to separate the soul from the body as much as is possible. 
For Socrates, the true sage regards the body as a prison for the soul and 
knows that the only escape consists in rejecting everything that has to 
do with the former and concentrating on the latter.26 Not apatheia, but 
ataraxia is what characterizes the philosopher’s likeness to god.
The “physical” explanation in the Timaeus may provide some clarifĳi-
cation as to why those who want to become assimilated to god should 
attempt to distance themselves from the world of change.27 Unlike the 
body, which is characterized by the six rectilinear motions proper to 
the sublunary world, the soul’s rational thought originally presents a 
circular motion, like that of the heavens. From the moment of birth, 
however, the pristine harmony of the soul’s circularity, attuned to the 
character of the eternal truths proper to it, is under pressure from sen-
sory perception. The rectilinear motions distinctive of the senses and 
the influx of information conveyed by them tend to corrupt the soul’s 
original state. Consequently, those who desire to be like god should 
improve their condition by re-establishing the circular motions of their 
intellects. As Timaeus puts it:
θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ 
δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συʳʳενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις 
24) See Annas 1999:58–62.
25) Plato, Theaetetus 176A–B. See above, page 74 and note 9.
26) Plato, Phaedo 67C, 83A.
27) On the issue, see Sedley 1997:328–335, 1999:316–319.78  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν 
περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, 
τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ 
τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ 
τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.
And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one — namely, to supply 
each with its own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us 
the congenial motions are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These 
each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which 
were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Uni-
verse, and thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought, 
in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness attain 
fĳinally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both 
for the present and for the time to come.28
David Sedley rightly comments that “the human soul’s capacity to pat-
tern itself after a divine mind is far from accidental, but directly reflects 
the soul’s own nature and origin and the teleological structure of the 
world as a whole.”29 In point of fact, according to the Timaeus, the ratio-
nal human soul was created of the same elements as the world soul, 
namely sameness, diffference, and being, which constitute rational 
thought. God, being good, ungrudgingly desired that everything would 
be as good as himself and in order to attain this goal he bestowed the 
whole cosmos, the human soul included, with intelligence.
However, what do we attain when we attune our minds to the mind 
of god? Human beings achieve happiness only when they recover the 
godlike state of their rational soul. The homoiosis theo is the process by 
which man frees his soul from everything mortal in order to attain the 
unrestrained exercise of his reason and achieve in this way the supreme 
fulfĳillment of his life. By doing, so the human soul regains its original 
divine form and consequently returns to its origin.
Given the changing perspectives on the homoiosis theo provided by 
Plato’s dialogues, it is not striking to fĳind certain hesitation in the later 
tradition as to the way it should be interpreted.30 As has been pointed 
28) Plato, Timaeus 90C–D. Translation by Lamb 1925.
29) Sedley 1999:328. On the circularity of thought, see also Laws 898Afff; Aristotle, 
De anima 406B 26–407B 11.
30) On the interpretation of the homoiosis theo in later (Middle and Neo-)Platonism, 
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out, interpreters are divided as to the moral or purely intellectual 
understanding of the homoiosis.31 Xenocrates,32 and probably Eudorus,33 
Stobaeus,34 Philo,35 and Alcinous,36 saw the ideal state achieved by the 
likeness to god as essentially moral. Aristotle, at the other interpretive 
extreme, even if recognizing the preparatory value of practical virtue, 
saw the summit of the assimilation as a purely intellectual enterprise.37 
On the basis of the testimony of Plutarch,38 who claimed the epoptic or 
contemplative character of the culmination of philosophy both for Plato 
1986:341–344 (Philo of Alexandria); Becchi 1996 (Plutarch); Commoth 1999 (Origen); 
Helmig 2005 (Plutarch).
31)   Sedley 1997:333–337.
32) Xenocrates fr. 236 Isnardi-Parent (apud Aristotle, Topics 112A36–38, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι 
τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν. ταὺτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα). As Sedley 1999:322 
note 18, rightly surmises, Xenocrates seems to be reinterpreting the etymology of 
Timaeus 90C.
33) Eudorus, test. 25 Mazzarelli; on which see Dörrie 1944:31–32. See also Dörrie and 
Baltes 1993:328 note 10. According to these scholars it was probably Eudorus who intro-
duced the assimilation to god as a Platonic telos formula and would be followed in this 
by numerous later Platonists. 
34) Stobaeus 2.49.8–25, in his interpretation, may rely on the testimony of another Pla-
tonist of the fĳirst century b.c.e., such as Eudorus, since according to the testimony of 
Cicero, De fĳin. 5.26, Antiochus of Ascalon still defĳined the telos in a stoic fashion as “liv-
ing in accordance with man’s nature.” On the moral interpretation of the telos formula, 
see Dörrie 1944:31–32; Dillon 1996:122–123.
35) Philo, Fug. 63; Opif. 144; On Philo’s use of Plato’s motif see Merki 1952:35–44; Belletti 
1982:419–440; Runia 1986:341–343.
36) Alcinous’ moral interpretation of the assimilation to god goes so far as to diffferenti-
ate between a god possessing virtues, namely the celestial god, and a god who is beyond 
it, namely the supercelestial one. See Alcinous, Didaskalikos 28; on which see Annas 
1999:63–66 and, more recently, Baltzly 2004:300.
37) Aristotle, NE 1177A12–1179A33.
38) Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 382D–E, “But the apperception of the conceptual, the pure, 
and the simple, shining through the soul like a flash of lightning, afffords an opportu-
nity to touch and see it but once. For this reason Plato and Aristotle call this part of 
philosophy the epoptic or mystic part, inasmuch as those who have passed beyond 
these conjectural and confused matters of all sorts by means of Reason proceed by 
leaps and bounds to that primary, simple, and immaterial principle; and when they 
have somehow attained contact with the pure truth abiding about it, they think that 
they have the whole of philosophy completely, as it were, within their grasp.” In the 
case of Plato, the epoptic telos of philosophy was already stated by Timaeus Lokros 
fr. 83 Marg; on which see Baltes 1972:236, by Plutarch himself in diffferent places 80  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
and Aristotle, Philip Merlan has already stressed that for Aristotle the 
process of knowledge seems to culminate in an intuitive, non-discursive 
act of intelligence.39 Support for this view comes from the Eudemian 
Ethics, which equates the human telos to the unrestrained contempla-
tion of the divinity: θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.40 So too does the Nico-
machean Ethics. After devoting ten books to a description of the human 
telos as a life of moral virtue, Aristotle asserts in the last paragraphs that 
the highest human happiness is theoria or contemplation. According to 
the Philosopher, it is in this act that we are most assimilated to the gods, 
since in it we are using our most divine element, the intellect.41 Signifĳi-
cantly, in this context Aristotle introduces a sentence reminiscent of the 
Platonic ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, when he afffĳirms that theoria is 
that by virtue of which we may achieve, as far as this is possible, immor-
tality (1177B 33, ἑφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν):42
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω 
βιώσεται, ἀʻʻ’ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον 
καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄʻʻην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ 
κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας 
ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀʻʻ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται 
ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ·
Such a life as this however, will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of 
his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is 
divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so 
much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the 
intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect 
divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that 
a man should have man’s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we 
ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live 
in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in 
power and value it far surpasses all the rest.43
(see De def. orac. 422C; Quaest. Conv. 718D–E) and by Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. 2,6; on 
which see Dörrie and Baltes 1996:252–253.
39) Merlan 1963:30–35.
40) Merlan 1963:34; Ross 1953.
41)   NE 1177A12–18.
42) On the issue, see Merlan 1963:34; Sedley 1999:325.
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It is therefore no surprise that Middle Platonists influenced by Aristotle, 
such as Apuleius44 or Plutarch,45 maintained that the likeness to god 
was achieved by combining a practical and a theoretical life. The Repub-
lic, by the way, was also seen to provide some support for this view, 
insofar as it endorsed the value of moral virtue, but attributed complete 
happiness to the godlike state of contemplation alone:
Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄʻʻαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐʳʳύς τι εἶναι τῶν 
τοῦ σώματος — τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ 
ἀσκήσεσιν — ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶʻʻον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
οὖσα.
Then the other so-called virtues of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For 
it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit 
and practice. But the excellence of thought, it seems, is certainly of a more divine 
quality.46
Interestingly, both of these Middle Platonic interpretations of Plato’s 
ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ are well attested to in Nag Hammadi writings. On the one 
hand, some texts offfer a mainly moral interpretation of godlikeness and 
simply focus on the ethical perspective that allows the individual to 
shun his material being and to concentrate on his divine nature. On the 
other, several texts of this corpus present an interesting combination 
of a moral and an intellectualistic conception of the homoiosis theo. In 
this amalgamation they seem to be following the contemporary Middle 
Platonic authors who, under the influence of Aristotle, allotted moral 
virtues a sort of preparatory role in the attainment of the highest intel-
lectual virtue. This combination of practical and theoretical life in the 
attainment of the likeness to god perfectly suited Gnostic cosmology and 
anthropology, since it provided an interesting soteriological framework 
in which assimilation could begin in this life, even though its supreme 
fulfĳillment took place after death with the so-called ascent of the soul.47
44) Apuleius, De Platone 2.23, with Dillon 1996:335.
45) Plutarch,  De sera num. vind. 550D–E and fragment 143 Sandbach, with Dillon 
1996:192–193.
46) Plato, Republic 518D–E. Translation by P. Shorey 1969.
47) See on the issue Luttikhuizen 2006:83–96, especially 95–96.82  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
The Assimilation to God in Nag Hammadi Texts
Given the amalgamation of Pythagorean lore regarding world and man 
in Plato’s dialogues and the complete absorption of the latter in Gnostic 
texts, it is no surprise to fĳind in Nag Hammadi the same views regard-
ing both human origins and their current condition. In Gnostic cosmol-
ogy and anthropology, the world and the physical body are conceived 
of as a prison for the divine spark, which individuals must by all means 
attempt to liberate from its confĳinement. Against the testimony of anti-
heretical writers, who were fond of attributing to Gnostics a theory of 
anthropological predestination,48 every human being is endowed with 
this godly element, but not everyone is aware of it. Those who pay heed 
to the divine external call, however, after being reminded of their divine 
origin and destination, are given the chance to progressively detach 
themselves from the world of change.
In this context, Gnostic texts present the same seeming ambiguity we 
found in Plato’s dialogues: even if man’s nature is undoubtedly divine, 
when dealing with the need to liberate humans from their current con-
dition, the texts nevertheless speak of “transformation.” “Becoming one 
from above,” “becoming spiritual,” “becoming male,”49 and “becoming 
divine”50 are the normal expressions to describe this.51 Of course, the 
question arises concerning why, if human beings are already divine, a 
metamorphosis is necessary at all. The answer to this question is that 
48) See above note 4.
49) On this expression, see Vogt 1991. See below pages 89 and 95 with note 102.
50) Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) 53.18–19 afffĳirms “I became divine”; see also 44.18–22. On the 
issue, see Luttikhuizen 2007:766. 
51)   See, for example, ApJames (NHC I,2) 6.19–20: “Make yourselves like the son of the 
Holy Spirit”; 13.13–17: “Once more I reprove you, you who are; become like those who 
are not, that you may be with those who are not; 16.20–21: “Endeavor earnestly then to 
make yourselves like them”; GosPhil (NHC II,3) 78.24–79.13: “Now you who live together 
with the Son of God, love not the world, but love the Lord, in order that those you 
will bring forth may not resemble the world, but may resemble the Lord”; ApocAdam 
(NHC V,5) 64.14–15. See also the text of TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 94.19–29 (below, page 90 
and note 74). In general, see most recently, Lundhaug 2010. For the Hermetic parallels 
to this notion see CH 13.3 on the palingenesia or “regeneration,” after which the indi-
vidual, having left behind every distortion proceeding from his material body, is able to 
focus on the intellect and, consequently, to assimilate himself to god. On the issue, see 
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we are still moving within a Platonic worldview. As we saw above, the 
transformation alluded to in Plato’s dialogues had to do with man’s 
current condition, namely his mixed nature, combining a divine and 
immortal nucleus with a mortal and degraded envelope. Gnostic writ-
ings describe this anthropological framework by means of an anthro-
pogonical myth that accounts for man’s ontological status. In the same 
way that human beings are consubstantial with the highest God and, in 
this sense, possess the divine spark that allows them to liberate them-
selves from their degraded condition, they also participate in the astral 
region (or archontic deities) who are responsible for the lower aspects of 
the human being, namely the soul and the body, the prison in which the 
spark has been locked up.52 As in Plato’s conception referred to above, 
oblivion is the fĳirst consequence of the contact with the physical world. 
As a result, the divine spark is numbed under the influence of external-
ity. Given the mixed nature of the human condition, the transformation 
behind the assimilation to god in Nag Hammadi texts implies, fĳirst, pay-
ing heed to the external (or internal) call that awakens the divine spark, 
then negating everything that is material and, fĳinally, concentrating on 
our divine inner nature. Leaving now aside the fĳirst step in this process, 
in the following pages I will focus on the latter two.
By focusing on their inner being of divine origin, Gnostics assimilate 
to God. To do so, individuals must fĳirst engage in a laborious process 
of deconstruction intended to neutralize the obstacles proceeding both 
from the body and the physical world and from the soul. It is in this 
context that ethics — also contrary to the black-and-white interpreta-
tion of the heresiologists53 — plays a central role.54 In addition to the 
scintilla animae and the external call, ethics was seen as essential dur-
ing this life, since it provided the means for the intellect’s unrestrained 
contemplation of that which is really existent.55 Gnostics saw their life 
52) According to King 1995:85–86, the Apocryphon of John provides an account of the 
mixed nature of the human by describing two ancestral lines, one of continuity unit-
ing Gnostics to the unknowable Father through the line of Man, Adam, and Seth (BG 
48.4–49.6) and another of discontinuity, relating them to Sophia and Yaldabaoth, who 
by means of the counterfeit spirit (NHC II,1: 24.26–31) leads men astray.
53) See Iren., Adv. haer. 1.13.3; 1.6.3–4; 1.25.3.
54) See Wisse 1975:55–86; see also, Rudolph 1990:261–293; Desjardins 1990; Williams 
1996; and recently Tite 2009.
55) See TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 113,33–114,6. Translation by Peel and Zandee 1996:248–369.84  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
as a contest in which they did their best to resist both the external and 
internal influences that could distract them from their main goal. The 
Authoritative Teaching (NHC VI,3) provides a nice example of this rather 
widespread view:56
He, then, the Father, wishing to reveal his wealth and his glory, brought about this 
great contest in this world, wishing to make the contestants appear, and make all 
those who contend leave behind the things that had come into being, and despise 
them with a lofty, incomprehensible knowledge, and flee to the one who exists.57
Consequently, even if not explicitly mentioned, the homoiosis theo 
pervades numerous texts of the Nag Hammadi corpus.58 As already 
advanced, Nag Hammadi texts move between two interpretative poles, 
namely the ethical and epistemological perspectives of the assimila-
tion to god.
The Ethical Interpretation of the Assimilation
Some texts indeed seem to focus on the ethical side of the process of 
assimilation. Given that man’s interior is of divine origin, the assimila-
tion seems to consist in neutralizing every single aspect that may pose a 
threat to the fulfĳillment of the process of interiorization. All alien influ-
ences ought to be shunned in order to be able to focus on one’s divine 
nucleus. At a certain stage, self-knowledge is achieved, and this knowl-
edge of the self is equated to knowledge of the divine.
This interpretation of the homoiosis theo in ethical terms is espe-
cially current in those Nag Hammadi texts endorsing standard Platonic 
anthropological and cosmological dualism, namely a bipartite view of 
man and of the world. In the same way that Plato opposed ideas to mat-
ter, this group of texts simply distinguish spiritual and physical realities, 
56) Asceticism and the rejection of the world was a central issue in fact, of which the 
Acts of Peter and the Twelve Apostles (NHC VI,1) 5.19–6.8 or the GosThom (21b; 58) pro-
vide adequate testimony.
57) See also AuthTeach (NHC VI,3) 26.8–26. Translation by MacRae 1979:257–289.
58) We do fĳind, however, Coptic attempts to render the transformation implied by the 
Greek term ὁμοῖωσις, notably the verbs EINE and TONTN, expressing in this context 
the notion “to become like,” “be like” God. See Siegert 1992, s.v. EINE (50B) “gleichen”; 
TONTN (237C), “gleichen, angleichen” and SHOPE (322A) “werden.”  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102  85
and contrast the inner and true being with the external and material 
sensible one. The emphasis on the practical side of assimilation seems 
to be due to the fact that moral virtue allows the individual to focus on 
that aspect of his being that is closest to God. By means of ethical efffort, 
individuals are, on the one hand, capable of neutralizing appearances 
that reach them through sensory perception; on the other hand, moral 
virtue allows them to control everything irrational within the soul, in 
this way limiting and eliminating possible influences from the passions. 
Having thus cut offf all possible harmful external and internal influences, 
individuals are now able to concentrate on their real nature.
In a passage which recalls Plato’s description of the true virtue of the 
philosopher in the Phaedo,59 the Sentences of Sextus (NHC XII,1) asserts 
that only he who pays heed to inner being is really wise:
No man who <looks> down upon the earth and upon tables is wise. The philoso-
pher who is an outer body, he is not the one to whom it is fĳitting to pay respect, but 
(the) philosopher according to the inner man.60
According to the dualistic view, standard in these texts, the physical 
body is an odious accretion, something alien to man’s real nature. Con-
sequently, the likeness to god attainable during this life is equated to 
taking distance from the tangible world and everything material and to 
focusing on the man within. This is the only way to recover our origi-
nal divine nature. Indeed, the Hermetic treatise Asclepius, a version of 
which is preserved in the Nag Hammadi codices (NHC VI,8),61 states 
that man has a double nature: one is simple and divine, and the other is 
material (ὑλικός) and formed out of the four elements. True, due to Stoic 
influence the Asclepius retains a positive view of the body, but it never-
theless stresses the higher quality of man’s “essential” part by describing 
it as “divine,” “eternal,” and “substantial”: it is through this part that man 
ascends to heaven.62
The important ethical dimension of this worldview can be seen in 
the fact that this attitude positively afffects both the individual and 
59) See above p. 77 and note 26.
60) SentSextus (NHC XII,1) 34.16–20. Translation by Wisse 1990:295–321.
61)   See Dirkse and Parrot 1979:399–451.
62) Asclepius 10 (308.23–309.1 NF).86  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
  community. From an individual perspective, the ethical side of the 
likeness to god manifests itself as a process of preparation, through 
which the individual releases the “man within” from the “net of flesh” 
of the body, as The Interpretation of Knowledge (NHC XI,1) puts it.63 
The goal is then to free oneself from the temporary residence in which 
humanity has been imprisoned by the rulers and authorities, who, in 
Pauline fashion, seem to govern the lower world of matter.64 From a 
communal perspective, once the individual has achieved the likeness 
to god as far as this is possible in this life, he may help others to do so 
as well. As The Letter of Peter to Philip (NHC VIII,2) asserts, Gnostics 
have to struggle against the “authorities” in order to “strip offf . . . what 
is corrupted” and free the inner man from his imprisonment. Having 
achieved this, they must become “illuminators in the midst of mortal 
men.” Passages like this seem to disprove the alleged solipsistic char-
acter of Gnostic idiosyncrasy, as described by Hans Jonas.65 In this 
sense, Kurt Rudolph66 rightly emphasizes a central passage of the Gos-
pel of Philip (NHC II,3) in which the communal obligations67 of those 
who fĳind freedom through knowledge come to the fore: “But ‘Love 
builds up’ (1 Co 8:1). In fact, he who is really free, through knowledge, 
is a slave, because of love for those who have not yet been able to 
attain to the freedom of knowledge. Knowledge makes them capable 
of becoming free.”68
63) InterprKnow (NHC XI,1) 6.30–35. For a similar but more general opposition see 
SentSextus (NHC XII,1) 34.16–20; GosPhil (NHC II,3) 82.30–83.9. For the notion of the 
body as “net of flesh,” see Aristotle, GA 734A16–20 with Bos 2003:338.
64) InterprKnow (NHC XI,1) 6.26–38.
65) Jonas 1964:170–171.
66) Rudolph 1987:264.
67) EpPetPhil (NHC VIII,2) 137,4–9. This communal perspective has been emphasized 
by Ménard 1977:44, who refers to GosThom 24, in which the same aspect comes to the 
fore: “There is light within a man of light, and he lights up the whole world. If he does 
not shine, he is darkness.” See also Bethge 1997:106.
68) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 77.15–35. Translation by Isenberg 2000:129–215. On the morality 
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The Combination of the Ethical and Epistemological Interpretation of the 
Assimilation
As noted above, however, there is a group of texts in which the homoiosis 
theo has a marked epistemological character. This approach can be seen 
in those Nag Hammadi texts, indeed the most numerous, that develop 
Plato’s basic soul-body bipartition towards a tripartite view, distinguish-
ing intellect, soul, and body. This development has important conse-
quences not only for the anthropological and cosmological background 
of the texts, but also for the theme we are dealing with. As to the former, 
the conception of man in this group of texts replaces the soul with the 
intellect, which assumes the highest position in the human hierarchy. 
Most importantly, not only is the intellect higher than the soul, but it 
is also man’s only immortal part: the soul is no longer conceived of as 
divine and everlasting, as was the case in the previous bipartite anthro-
pological scheme, but clearly as mortal.69 Accordingly, the view on the 
cosmos is slightly altered, with one region, the astral sphere, being added 
to the divine and sublunar realms of the bipartite schemes. Thanks to 
the strict correlation between the cosmological and anthropological 
schemes70 the diffferent aspects in man are conceived of as belonging to 
one cosmological region. After death, the body returns to the elements, 
the soul is given back to the archons who populate the astral region, and 
the nous or the pneuma speeds to its divine abode.
As far as the influence of this new scheme on the theme we are deal-
ing with is concerned, the homoiosis theo experiences an interesting 
shift, since the practical side leaves room for a more contemplative kind 
of assimilation. Of course, the ethical aspect still plays a very impor-
tant role, but it acquires a marked preparatory character. As was also 
the case in the previous group of texts, the “likeness to god as far as 
this is attainable during this life” is achieved by controlling, by means 
of reason, the bodily and psychic accretions and by focusing on man’s 
only godly element, the intellect. Once freed from the pressure of both, 
the intellect is able to develop the activity proper to it, which is theoria 
69) For the Aristotelian background of this assertion see Bos 2001:57–70, passim and 
Bos 2003:280.
70) On the issue, see Roig Lanzillotta 2013.88  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
or   contemplation.71 It is at this moment that the individual attains the 
desired fusion with the divine resulting from this vision. This is the 
homoiosis theo in the highest degree. I think that the Aristotelian influ-
ence mediated by some Middle Platonic authors on this group of texts is 
not only visible in the tripartite anthropological and cosmological pat-
terns, but also in the auxiliary function of ethical virtue, which allows 
for the preparatory stage that will open the door to the fĳinal completion 
of the homoiosis theo, namely contemplation. In addition, the Aristote-
lian Unmoved Mover also lurks behind the epistemological godlikeness. 
Given that God is conceived of in Aristotelian fashion as a transcendent 
Intellect or nous beyond the world of discursive knowledge, the assimi-
lation strives to achieve the intuitive and immediate kind of apprehen-
sion proper to it.
The Ethical Preparation
The Treatise on Resurrection (NHC I,4)72 provides us with an interesting 
example of this combination of the preparatory and defĳinitive kinds of 
assimilation to god. The text predictably focuses on the highest achieve-
ment of the spiritual resurrection, which equates to the ascent of the 
soul by means of which people may recover what “belongs to them.” The 
“spiritual resurrection, which swallows up the psychic in the same way 
as the fleshly,” allows the transformation of the soul, by which it recov-
ers its primal divine status.73 However, the assimilation to God taking 
place now is but the culmination of a laborious process that began much 
earlier:
Rheginus, do not get lost in details, nor live according to the flesh for the sake of 
harmony. Flee from divisions and bonds, and then you already have resurrection . . . 
71) Most of the texts are not explicit as to whether this supreme stage is achieved dur-
ing this life or after death (see, however, below). Perhaps from their perspective this 
aspect was not even relevant. What they do explicitly emphasize, however, is the epis-
temological character of the assimilation.
72) See TreatRes (NHC I,4) 45.39–46.2; Peel 1985:137–215; Peel 1969:48–49, 74–75, 112–13, 
148; Layton 1971: 65–66, 71–73, 78, 82–84; GosMary (BG 1) 10.14–16.
73) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 45.40–46.2. Translation by Peel 1985:123–57. On the notion of 
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Everyone needs to practice ways to be released from this element so as not to wan-
der in error.74
As the Treatise afffĳirms, the resurrection has already begun. Resurrec-
tion, or assimilation, begins in this world by means of searching for the 
unity lost in the dispersal. The term used to describe it, to wit “practice” 
(γυμνάζω), emphasizes the ethical character of this work in the process 
of annihilating every source of distortion: individuals ought to over-
come the division and dispersion occasioned by both body and mate-
rial world. It is this process that enables the desired assimilation to the 
divine, the resurrection in the strict sense of the word, through which 
Rheginus may supersede the illusion of appearances:
The world is illusion . . . The resurrection is diffferent. It is real, it stands fĳirm. It is 
the revelation of what is, a transformation of things, a transition into newness. 
Incorruptibility [flows] over corruption, light flows over darkness, swallowing it, 
fullness fĳills what it lacks. These are the symbols and images of the resurrection. 
This brings goodness.75
Control of body and soul as a preparation for the supreme fulfĳillment or 
homoiosis theo also comes to the fore in The Teachings of Silvanus (NHC 
VII,4). Self-knowledge helps the individual to recognize the mortal parts 
of his being in order to reject everything that is alien and “become male,” 
a favorite metaphor pointing to the assimilation to the divine.76 Again, 
the preparatory ethical process is presented as a contest in which indi-
viduals must fĳight against robbers who try catch them.77 Struggle and 
continuous efffort will free the mind from the chains of body and soul78 
74) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 49.9–16.
75) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 48.27–49.7.
76) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 92.34–93.24. On the expression see above, note 49 and below 
notes 102.
77) AuthTeach (NHC VI,3) 26.8–26. See supra p. 84 and note 57. See on the notion of the 
robbers ExSoul (NHC II,6) 127.27. On the Aristotelian background of this motif, see Bos 
2003:315–357 on Aristotle’s Protrepticus 10b Ross.
78) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 113.31–114.30: “Then beware, lest somehow you fall into the 
hands of robbers. Do not allow sleep to your eyes nor drowsiness to your eyelids, that 
you may be saved like a gazelle from nets, and like a bird from a trap. Fight the great 
fĳight as long as the fĳight lasts, while all the powers are staring after you — not only the 
holy ones, but also all the powers of the Adversary.”90  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
thus enabling the attainment of the last stage, also described using the 
well-known metaphor of the bridal chamber, the waiting room, as it 
were, in which individuals attend the fĳinal reunion with the divinity:
O obstinate soul, be sober and shake offf your drunkenness, which is the work of 
ignorance. If you are obstinate and live in the body, you dwell in a boorish condi-
tion. When you have entered into a bodily birth, you were begotten. [When you 
were born again] you came to be in the bridal chamber, and you were illuminated 
in mind.79
At this point, individuals are prepared to start the flight to their origin, 
to God: “Listen, my son, and do not be slow with your ears. Raise your-
self up when you have left your old man behind like an eagle.”80 This 
very last stage, however, can only be achieved by the intellect, by the 
highest and only divine element in man, since the “divine mind . . . has 
come into being in conformity with the image of God. The divine mind 
has the substance of God.”81 Whether externally or internally induced, 
divine knowledge is essential to start the process of introspection. The 
Hermetic Prayer of Thanksgiving (NHC VI,7) therefore praises God for 
making himself accessible:
We rejoice, having been illuminated by Your knowledge. We rejoice because You 
have shown us Yourself. We rejoice because while we were in (the) body, You have 
made us divine through Your knowledge.82
Behind this conception we see the old Pre-Socratic principle of “like 
knows like,” which implies a necessary consubstantiality between 
the subject and object of knowledge. As the eleventh Hermetic tract 
emphatically afffĳirms, “If you do not make yourself like God, you cannot 
know God, for like can only be known by like.”83 It is the previous ethi-
cal process that allows the Gnostic to eschew everything alien from his 
79) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 94.19–29.
80) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 114.15–19.
81)   TeachSilv (NHC VII, 4) 92.23–26.
82) PrThanks (NHC VI,7) 64.16–19. For the Coptic version of the Prayer of Thanksgiving 
along with the Greek version, preserved in the Papyrus Mimaut, and its Latin version in 
Asclepius 41b, see Dirkse and Brashler 1979:375–387.
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being, to shun the likeness of the soul and that of the body and to retain 
only that which makes him divine, to wit the spirit. This principle is 
clearly stated in the Gospel of Philip:
Members of a race usually have associated with those of like race. So spirit mingles 
with spirit, and thought consorts with thought, and light shares with light. If you 
are born a human being, it is the human being who will love you. If you become 
a spirit, it is the spirit which will be joined to you. If you become thought, it is 
thought which will mingle with you. If you become light, it is the light which will 
share with you. If you become one of those who belong above, it is those who 
belong above who will rest upon you.84
As we saw above, human beings are endowed from the beginning with 
the divine spark and are potentially divine. At the same time, however, 
they also share the likeness of the lower world. It is up to them to choose 
one or the other:
If you become horse or ass or bull or dog or sheep, or another of the animals which 
are outside or below, then neither human being nor spirit nor thought nor light 
will be able to love you. Neither those who belong above nor those who belong 
within will be able to rest in you, and you have no part in them.85
The Apocryphon of John mythologically describes the contest between 
man’s true spiritual (or intellectual) nature and his psychic and physical 
being by presenting it as a contest between the Father and the lower 
creator god, who fĳight, as it were, for the conquest of man.86 The like-
ness of the Father is counteracted by the Demiurge or lower creator god, 
who “planted (in Adam) sexual desire . . . that gave birth to a copy from 
their counterfeit spirit.”87 This counterfeit spirit, agglutinating body and 
soul, intends to lead men astray, impeding in this way man’s likeness to 
God.88 Ethics, however, helps humans to supersede their defĳicient like-




87) ApJohn (BG) 63.5–9. Translation according to Waldstein and Wisse 1995.
88) ApJohn (NHC II,1) 29.23–25.92  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
Those on whom the Spirit of life will descend and (with whom) he will be with the 
power, they will be saved and beco  me perfect and be worthy of the greatness and 
be purifĳied in that place from all wickedness and the involvements in evil. Then 
they have no other care than the incorruption alone, to which they direct their 
attention from here on, without anger or envy or jealousy or desire and greed of 
anything. They are not afffected by anything except the state of being in the flesh 
alone, which they bear while looking expectantly for the time when they will be 
met by the receivers (of the body). Such then are worthy of the imperishable, eter-
nal life and the calling. For they endure everything and bear up under everything, 
that they may fĳinish the good fĳight and inherit eternal life.89
Scholars interpret this section as a state of apatheia as an “eradication 
of passions,”90 but in my view it is better described as one of ataraxia 
or “imperturbability,” in which the individual, by means of ethical 
efffort, namely metriopatheia or “moderation of the passions,” continu-
ously monitors new threats proceeding from the outside world in order 
to turn himself inwards. This is clear in the ApJohn, since even if not 
afffected by anything else, individuals still have to cope with their being 
in the flesh. In all the other texts referred to until now the dynamic char-
acter of ethical progress seems to point in the same direction. The state 
of ataraxia or “imperturbability” attained by means of self-knowledge 
and the determination to despise everything related to soul and body is 
not as defĳinitive as one could expect from a state of apatheia. Rather, it 
is under the continuous threat of appearances and passions.
In dealing with the world and with appearances, however, the focus 
on the fĳinal destination helps individuals to overcome external threats. 
In fact, the fĳirm determination to achieve the fĳinal and higher goal 
allows Gnostics to re-characterize their value framework:
. . . neither are the good good, nor the evil evil, nor is life life, nor death death. This 
is why each one will dissolve into its original source. But those who are exalted 
above the world will not be dissolved, for they are eternal.91
What is ethically correct is not established by worldly standards, but 
rather by a purpose to become assimilated to the divine: everything 
89)  ApJohn (NHC II,1) 25.23–26.3.
90) King 1995:88.
91)   GosPhil (NHC II,3) 53.17–23.  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102  93
that may be a threat to this development is morally wrong. This aspect 
also comes to the fore in the Gospel of Mary, when Peter asks the Sav-
ior what sin is. He then answers, “There is no such thing as sin; rather 
you yourselves are what produces sin when you act in accordance with 
the nature of adultery, which is called ‘sin.’ ”92 This “nature of adultery” 
refers, according to a rather widespread Gnostic metaphor, to one’s 
inner core’s interaction with the world of matter, which was conceived 
of as “unnatural” to such an extent that the Expository Treatise on the 
Soul (NHC II,6) describes it as prostitution and rape.93 The point is that, 
as Karen King puts it, “like adultery, sin joins together what should not 
be mixed: in this case, material and spiritual natures. Attachment to 
the material world constitutes adulterous consorting against one’s own 
spiritual nature.”94 The likeness to god, in contrast, helps individuals 
overcome the shortcomings of their phenomenal being. They achieve 
this by means of the mind, which, as we saw above, has the substance of 
God. The Savior therefore afffĳirms in GosMary that “where the mind is, 
there is the treasure.”95
The Epistemological Culmination
It is precisely due to the adulterous association of the soul with the 
tangible world96 that likeness to god is necessary. This transformative 
process will allow individuals, fĳirst, to recover their pristine nature in 
order to participate, once the assimilation has been fulfĳilled, in the fĳinal 
fusion of like and like. However, in order to do so the metamorphosis 
must also include, strictly speaking, worldly sorts of cognition, namely 
discursive thinking. As GosPhil puts it:
It is not possible for anyone to see anything of the things that actually exist unless 
he becomes like them. This is not the way with man in the world: he sees the sun 
without being a sun; and he sees the heaven and the earth and all other things, 
but he is not these things. This is quite in keeping with the truth. But you saw 
92) GosMary (BG 8502,1) 7.10–16. Translation by Wilson and Parrot 1979:453–471.
93) ExSoul (NHC II,6) 127.18–128.17. On the issue, see Roig Lanzillotta 2010:403–408.
94) King 2003b:50.
95) GosMary (BG 8502,1) 10.15–16.
96) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 61.10–12, “every association which came into being between 
those unlike one another is adultery.”94  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
  something of that place, and you became those things. You saw the Spirit, you 
became spirit. You saw Christ, you became Christ. You saw the Father, you shall 
become Father. So in this place you see everything and do not see yourself, but in 
that place you do see yourself — and what you see you shall become.97
The fĳirst part encourages individuals to supersede a discursive kind of 
knowledge, which is alluded to by the diffferentiation between the sub-
ject and object of knowledge; the second describes the intuitive and 
direct apprehension of the really existent. It is at this moment of con-
templation that the supreme fulfĳillment is achieved. The lines separat-
ing the subject and object of knowledge are blurred and they fuse into 
one single supra-rational, intuitive act.
It seems clear that behind these views we fĳind Middle Platonic dis-
cussions both on the nature of God and the ways to access him. Given 
that God is conceived of as completely transcending the realm of being, 
knowledge of him cannot be reached through worldly means. The 
famous Middle Platonic quattuor viae for the knowledge of God, indeed 
build on human worldly epistemological means with a view to purify-
ing human beings and preparing them for a higher sort of acquaintance 
with the divine: negation, eminence, analogy, and imitation are the four 
scholastic ways through which the individual may supersede discur-
sive means of knowledge in order to attain contemplation or direct and 
intuitive knowledge.98
As a matter of fact, there is a group of texts that tends to obviate 
the preparatory ethical side of the process of assimilation and directly 
focus on the higher form of the homoiosis, namely the epistemologi-
cal path that fĳinally leads Gnostics beyond discursivity to an intuitive 
knowledge of God. Interestingly, these treatises at the same time tend 
to ignore the external intervention of divine revealers: knowledge of 
God does not result from revelation, but rather from a process of spiri-
tual ascent for which the experience of a visionary fĳigure provides an 
example.99 Indeed Marsanes (NHC X), Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1), and 
97) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 61.20–35.
98) On the use of these four ways, its application and precedents, see Roig Lanzillotta 
2007:205–07. For Middle Platonic expositions on the issue, see Alcinous, Didask. 165.14–
34; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 11.11b; Origen, Contra Celsum 7.42. On the issue, see Dörrie 
1960:213–214; Dillon 1993:107–110, Turner 2001:481–495.
99) Turner 2001:637.  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102  95
Allogenes (NHC XI,3) are named after these visionaries, whose ascent 
is conceived of mainly from a cognitive perspective100 and includes, as 
John Turner conveniently summarizes, three stages: the fĳirst is the “pre-
liminary, earthly stage of discursive cognition that sufffĳices to distinguish 
the corporeal . . . realm of becoming from the eternal, changeless realm 
of incorporeal essences”; then we have the second, “a non-discursive 
cognition of the realm of pure, incorporeal being induced by an out-
of-body contemplative ascent to the divine intellect or its equivalent.” 
The third and fĳinal stage is that of a “non-cognitive contemplation of 
supreme principles that are altogether beyond being in which both the 
psycho-physical and the intellectual faculties have been abandoned.”101 
Of course, the ethical aspect can still be recognized in stage one, since 
the goal is still avoidance of every distortion proceeding both from body 
and soul. Man needs to flee from every source of distortion or, according 
to the metaphor referred to above associating rationality with masculin-
ity and the rest with femininity, from “the madness and the bondage of 
femaleness and choose for the salvation of maleness.”102 However, the 
process of liberation from these constrictions seems to be more of an 
intellectual than a behavioral kind. As Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) puts it:
After I parted from the somatic darkness in me and the psychic chaos in mind 
and the feminine desire . . . in the darkness, I did not use it again. After I found 
the infĳinite part of my matter, then I reproved the dead creation within me 
and the divine Cosmocrator of the perceptible (world) by preaching powerfully 
about the All to those with alien parts.103
100) The ascent pattern of these three Nag Hammadi texts has been dealt with by Lutt-
ikhuizen 2007:764–770.
101)   See Turner 2001:637–692.
102) Zostrianos (VIII,1) 131.5–8. Translation by Sieber 1991:30–225.
103) Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) 1.10–21. This cognitive approach of the fĳirst stage is perhaps 
even clearer in the beginning of Marsanes (NHC X) 4.24–5.21: “For I am he who has 
understood that which truly exists, whether partially or wholly, according to diffference 
and sameness, that they exist from the beginning in the entire place which is eternal, 
<i.e.> all those that have come into existence, whether without being or with being, 
those who are unbegotten, and the divine aeons, together with the angels, and the souls 
which are without guile, and the soul-garments, the likenesses of the simple ones. And 
afterwards, they have been mixed with . . . them. But still . . . the entire being . . . which 
imitates the incorporeal being and the unsubstantial (fem.). Finally the entire defĳile-
ment was saved, together with the immortality of the former (fem.). I have deliberated, 96  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
In any case, this fĳirst stage allows the second one, in which the visionar-
ies attain non-discursive cognition of the really existent. This phase is 
essential for the last stage, since it shows the way to the fĳinal contempla-
tion of the supreme principles, the stage in which the Unknowable God 
is reached by means of “ignorant knowledge.” As the revelation of the 
Luminaries of Allogenes (NHC XI,3) puts it:
And when you receive a revelation of him by means of a primary revelation of 
the Unknown One — the One whom if you should know him, be ignorant of 
him — and you become afraid in that place, withdraw to the rear because of the 
activities. And when you become perfect in that place, still yourself. And in accor-
dance with the pattern that indwells you, know likewise that it is this way in all 
such (matters) after this pattern. And do not further dissipate, so that you may be 
able to stand, and do not desire to be active, lest you fall in any way from the inac-
tivity in you of the Unknown One. Do not know him, for it is impossible; but if by 
means of an enlightened thought you should know him, be ignorant of him.104
The superseding of every physical and psychic accretion allows the 
recovery of the primary intellectual nature of our being. The attainment 
of the Unknowable One, however, requires that we abandon every activ-
ity proper to this intellectual nature as well. Desire to know should also 
be left behind in order to recover the characteristic inactivity and still-
ness of the fĳirst principle. The ignorant knowledge of the One implies 
overcoming all single aspects of our phenomenal being, the recovery 
of the divine pattern dwelling in us, and the passive vision of the One 
according to that pattern. It is at this moment that the fĳinal assimilation 
to God takes place. Once subject and object fuse in the same passive act 
they become one single reality.
Closing Remarks
Independently of the interpretation one gives it, whether ontological 
or moral, whether physical or epistemological, the Platonic homoiosis 
and have attained to the boundary of the sense-perceptible world. <I have come to 
know> part by part the entire place of the incorporeal being, and <I> have come to know 
the intelligible world. <I have come to know>, when <I> was deliberating, whether in 
every respect the sense-perceptible world is worthy of being saved entirely.”
104) Allogenes (XI,3) 59.26–60.12. Translation by Turner 1990:192–241.  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102  97
theo appears as pure optimism. In spite of the rather negative view of 
physical life and of the worldly context in which it takes place, the confĳi-
dence that human efffort may attain the desired liberation from its con-
strictions is clearly optimistic. In fact, the homoiosis theo is the process 
through which human beings, aware of their present mortal shortcom-
ings, but also of their pristine divine nature, engage in a personal devel-
opment that will fĳinally change their nature for the better, that will help 
them to attain divinity as far as this is possible — which, by the way, in 
the Platonic sense does not mean impossible.
Given the variety of approaches to this process in Plato’s dialogues, 
it is not surprising that Middle Platonists, in their appropriation of the 
Platonic principle, also interpreted it in diverse ways. Some Middle Pla-
tonists clearly adopt an ethical interpretation of the homoiosis, since it 
was presented as telos or “goal” of man’s life, which occupied a central 
place in Hellenistic and Late Antique discussions on ethics. Another 
group of Middle Platonists, however, under the influence of Aristotle, 
tends to prefer the epistemological interpretation. True, they retain the 
value of the ethical process, but more as a preparation for the higher 
fulfĳillment of assimilation, which took place once all worldly ties, even 
those of discursive reasoning, had been left behind.
One fĳinds precisely the same approach in Nag Hammadi texts that 
deal with the assimilation to God, by which they obviously meant 
the highest, transcendent, and unknowable God. The ethical and the 
epistemological approaches to the likeness to God that we fĳind in Nag 
Hammadi texts simply echo the same interpretations one fĳinds in con-
temporary Middle Platonism. Against the testimony of anti-heretical 
writings and some modern approaches to the world of Gnosticism, the 
analysis of the Nag Hammadi corpus allows us to afffĳirm that the world-
view behind it is optimistic rather than pessimistic. Admittedly, the 
view of the world we live in and our physical body is certainly negative 
and is often presented in very dark hues. The myth of the cave in Plato’s 
Republic and the flight from this world in the Phaedo, however, seem 
to provide sufffĳicient precedent for these views, and no one would label 
(pace Nietszche) Plato’s philosophy pessimistic.
Gnostics, it is true, to a certain extent radicalize Plato’s dualism, since 
it now afffects not only cosmology and anthropology, but also theol-
ogy. However, this radicalization also reaches the very concept of the 98  L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102
  assimilation to god, by means of which humanity could be freed from 
the oppression of existence. On the one hand, we see a higher confĳi-
dence in the possibility of salvation, which is attained by recovering the 
unmixed nature of one’s divine condition. One may even say that they 
drop the end of Plato’s motto, namely the expression of kata to dunaton, 
“as far as this is possible,” since either through revealers or by personal 
development individuals are always granted the vision of their real self. 
On the other hand, they clearly widen the scope of this assimilation, 
which now includes not only those devoted to philosophy, as in Plato 
and Middle Platonic writers, but clearly embraces all human beings, 
with the only exception, apparently, those who obstinately resist the 
call. Given that every human being receives the godly spark, no one is 
in principle excluded from the possibility of salvation, even if personal 
choice may determine their path towards the worse. Gnostic anthropol-
ogy, consequently, may be labeled dynamic rather than static, and open 
to change rather than deterministic. Ethical efffort played a central role 
both for the individual and the community and the desired prize was 
the eudaimonia, namely a life of bliss achieved by the fusion with God.
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